Port Investments on Coastal and Marine Disasters Prevention: An Economic and Policy Investigation

Abstract

Located along shorelines, seaports are highly vulnerable to coastal and marine natural disasters. Damage caused by disasters can be prevented or alleviated if sufficient investments are made in a timely manner. However, despite a wide range of investment options and well-developed engineering expertise, port investment on disaster prevention remains a challenging task involving great complexities. This paper develops an integrated economic model for the analysis of disaster-prevention investments at a “landlord” port. It simultaneously considers the uncertainty of disaster occurrence and associated return of prevention investments, the information accumulation and related investment timing, and the spillovers (externalities) of investment among stakeholders. Our analysis shows that the timing of port investments depends on the probability of disasters. Immediate investment is optimal for disasters with very high probability, while investment should be postponed if such a probability is very low. Optimal timing for cases of intermediate probability cannot be determined analytically, as it is influenced by other factors such as discount rate, information accumulation and efficiency of investments. Positive externalities between a port and its tenants lead to under-investment, which can be corrected by coordination between stakeholders. However, since there are risks of “over-investment” due to uncertainty, government intervention is only optimal with a good understanding of disaster probability distribution.