Summary

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Open Access

Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Hedden, Brian
dc.date.accessioned	2021-01-19T00:59:00Z
dc.date.available	2021-01-19T00:59:00Z
dc.date.issued	2017	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/2123/24328
dc.description.abstract	Reasons without Persons is a defense of a time-slice-centric conception of rationality, on which the locus of rationality, to speak metaphorically, is the time-slice rather than the temporally extended person. On this view, the relationship between two time-slices of a single agent (your earlier self and your later self, say) is not different in kind, as far as rational evaluation is concerned, from the relationship between two distinct agents. How you are, or how you believe you are, at other times plays no special role in determining what rationality requires of you right now.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.publisher	Oxford University Press	en
dc.rights	Other
dc.subject	time-slice, rationality, epistemology	en
dc.title	Summary	en
dc.type	Preprint	en
dc.subject.asrc	2203 Philosophy	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1093/analys/anx065
dc.rights.other	This article has been accepted for publication in Analysis Published by Oxford University Press.	en
usyd.faculty	SeS faculties schools::Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences	en
usyd.department	Philosophy	en
workflow.metadata.only	No	en