Summary
Access status:
Open Access
Type
PreprintAuthor/s
Hedden, BrianAbstract
Reasons without Persons is a defense of a time-slice-centric conception of rationality, on which
the locus of rationality, to speak metaphorically, is the time-slice rather than the temporally
extended person. On this view, the relationship between two time-slices of a single agent
(your earlier self and your later self, say) is not different in kind, as far as rational evaluation
is concerned, from the relationship between two distinct agents. How you are, or how you
believe you are, at other times plays no special role in determining what rationality requires
of you right now.Reasons without Persons is a defense of a time-slice-centric conception of rationality, on which
the locus of rationality, to speak metaphorically, is the time-slice rather than the temporally
extended person. On this view, the relationship between two time-slices of a single agent
(your earlier self and your later self, say) is not different in kind, as far as rational evaluation
is concerned, from the relationship between two distinct agents. How you are, or how you
believe you are, at other times plays no special role in determining what rationality requires
of you right now.
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Date
2017Publisher
Oxford University PressLicence
OtherRights statement
This article has been accepted for publication in Analysis Published by Oxford University Press.Faculty/School
Faculty of Arts and Social SciencesDepartment, Discipline or Centre
PhilosophyShare