Folk Physics, Intervention and the Concept of Cause
| Field | Value | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | Hitchcock, Chris | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2006-08-18 | |
| dc.date.available | 2006-08-18 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2006-07-19 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2123/1083 | |
| dc.description | Contains one audio recording (mp3) and one set of presentation notes | en |
| dc.description.abstract | Our interventions in the world are guided by our folk physical theories of how the world works. For example, we know that we can move an object by pushing it with a stick, but not by pushing it with a rope. Nothing could seem more natural. Yet recent research on primates suggests that this kind of reasoning is far from trivial. Making use of an account of theoretical concepts due to Hempel and Carnap, I argue that one of the central roles of our concept of cause is to mediate inferences between interventions and folk physical theories. | en |
| dc.format.extent | 46484255 bytes | |
| dc.format.mimetype | audio/mp3 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.publisher | Centre for Time, Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney. | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Origins III :: Intervention, Time and Physics | en |
| dc.rights | This material is copyright. Other than for the purposes of and subject to the conditions prescribed under the Copyright Act, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be altered, reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission from the University of Sydney Library and/or the appropriate author. | en |
| dc.rights.uri | http://www.usyd.edu.au/disclaimer.shtml | en |
| dc.subject | Time | en |
| dc.subject | Folk physics | en |
| dc.title | Folk Physics, Intervention and the Concept of Cause | en |
| dc.type | Recording, oral | en_AU |
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