Folk Physics, Intervention and the Concept of Cause
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Open Access
Type
Recording, oralAuthor/s
Hitchcock, ChrisAbstract
Our interventions in the world are guided by our folk physical theories of how the world works. For example, we know that we can move an object by pushing it with a stick, but not by pushing it with a rope. Nothing could seem more natural. Yet recent research on primates suggests that this kind of reasoning is far from trivial. Making use of an account of theoretical concepts due to Hempel and Carnap, I argue that one of the central roles of our concept of cause is to mediate inferences between interventions and folk physical theories.Our interventions in the world are guided by our folk physical theories of how the world works. For example, we know that we can move an object by pushing it with a stick, but not by pushing it with a rope. Nothing could seem more natural. Yet recent research on primates suggests that this kind of reasoning is far from trivial. Making use of an account of theoretical concepts due to Hempel and Carnap, I argue that one of the central roles of our concept of cause is to mediate inferences between interventions and folk physical theories.
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Date
2006-07-19Publisher
Centre for Time, Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney.Licence
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