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dc.contributor.authorAnderson, E.J.
dc.contributor.authorHolmberg, P.
dc.contributor.authorPhilpott, A.B.
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-09T02:58:00Z
dc.date.available2012-03-09T02:58:00Z
dc.date.issued2009-11
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2123/8162
dc.description.abstractUsing the concept of market-distribution functions, we derive general optimality conditions for discriminatory divisible-good auctions, which are also applicable to Bertrand games and non-linear pricing. We introduce the concept of offer distribution function to analyze randomized offer curves, and characterize mixed-strategy Nash equilibria for pay-as-bid auctions where demand is uncertain and costs are common knowledge; a setting for which pure-strategy supply function equilibria typically do not exist. We generalize previous results on mixtures over horizontal offers as in Bertrand-Edgeworth games, but more importantly we characterize novel mixtures over partly increasing supply functions.en_AU
dc.language.isoenen_AU
dc.publisherBusiness Analyticsen_AU
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBAWP-2009-02en_AU
dc.subjectPay-as-bid auctionen_AU
dc.subjectdivisible good auctionen_AU
dc.subjectmixed strategy equilibriaen_AU
dc.subjectwholesale electricity marketsen_AU
dc.titleMixed strategies in discriminatory divisible-good auctionsen_AU
dc.typeWorking Paperen_AU
dc.contributor.departmentDiscipline of Business Analyticsen_AU


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