Mixed strategies in discriminatory divisible-good auctions
Field | Value | Language |
dc.contributor.author | Anderson, E.J. | |
dc.contributor.author | Holmberg, P. | |
dc.contributor.author | Philpott, A.B. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-03-09 | |
dc.date.available | 2012-03-09 | |
dc.date.issued | 2009-11-01 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2123/8162 | |
dc.description.abstract | Using the concept of market-distribution functions, we derive general optimality conditions for discriminatory divisible-good auctions, which are also applicable to Bertrand games and non-linear pricing. We introduce the concept of offer distribution function to analyze randomized offer curves, and characterize mixed-strategy Nash equilibria for pay-as-bid auctions where demand is uncertain and costs are common knowledge; a setting for which pure-strategy supply function equilibria typically do not exist. We generalize previous results on mixtures over horizontal offers as in Bertrand-Edgeworth games, but more importantly we characterize novel mixtures over partly increasing supply functions. | en_AU |
dc.language.iso | en | en_AU |
dc.publisher | Business Analytics | en_AU |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | BAWP-2009-02 | en_AU |
dc.subject | Pay-as-bid auction | en_AU |
dc.subject | divisible good auction | en_AU |
dc.subject | mixed strategy equilibria | en_AU |
dc.subject | wholesale electricity markets | en_AU |
dc.title | Mixed strategies in discriminatory divisible-good auctions | en_AU |
dc.type | Working Paper | en_AU |
dc.contributor.department | Discipline of Business Analytics | en_AU |
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