Does Stakeholder Outrage Determine Executive Pay?

Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Balogh, Attila	en
dc.contributor.author	Wright, Danika J.	en
dc.contributor.author	Zein, Jason	en
dc.date.accessioned	2022-07-04T00:45:59Z
dc.date.available	2022-07-04T00:45:59Z
dc.date.issued	2022
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/2123/29072
dc.description.abstract	An unprecedented number of firms announced CEO salary reductions at the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, which we argue was triggered by an exogenous increase in stakeholder outrage toward executive pay. We document that the overall compensation of these CEOs did not meaningfully decrease compared to other CEOs due to a large reallocation to opaque components of compensation and perks, especially among powerful CEOs and firms with weak governance. Our results are robust to alternative explanations of CEO pay-setting. We highlight the role of managerial power in determining executive compensation and the importance of strong corporate governance during crises.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.rights	Other	en
dc.subject	COVID-19	en
dc.subject	Coronavirus	en
dc.title	Does Stakeholder Outrage Determine Executive Pay?	en
dc.type	Preprint	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.2139/ssrn.4053057
usyd.faculty	The University of Sydney Business School

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