Gathering Storm: Structuring More Successful Responses to Disasters

Abstract

Abstract The period between 1992 and 2005 was turbulent for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Failed responses to Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina resulted in academics questioning the efficacy of FEMA’s structure and ability to coordinate a response. The literature studying this phenomenon focuses on whether the failed responses were due to FEMA’s structure being too flexible or too hierarchical. This thesis argues this duality misses the point. First, the literature is overly focused on failure at the expense of success. This necessarily ignores half the story. Analysing successful responses will provide a more holistic view of what structures are the most appropriate in a response. Second, responses are never wholly open or closed but rather a mixture of both. FEMA’s responses need to be disaggregated into their strategic (policy-makers) and operational (implementers) components and their combinations examined. With reference to two failures, Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, and two successes, The Great Midwest Floods and Northridge Earthquake, this thesis argues optimal response frameworks are strategically closed and operationally open.