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dc.contributor.authorLombard, Alex
dc.date.accessioned2007-12-19
dc.date.available2007-12-19
dc.date.issued2007-12-19
dc.identifier.issnN/A
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2123/2158
dc.descriptionHons Thesisen
dc.description.abstractABSTRACT: What are the implications of second-strike nuclear forces for neorealism? The end of the Cold War yielded a unipolar structure of international politics defined by the military, economic, and political preponderance of the United States. According to balance-of-power theory, which lies at the heart of neorealism, unipolarity has a short life span as secondary states waste little time in rectifying the global imbalance of power. Thus far, America remains unbalanced. Are we to take this as a refutation of balance-of-power theory? My thesis argues that second-strike arsenals render void the need to balance superior American military power. But because state survival is contingent not only upon military invulnerability (for which nuclear weapons are a sure guarantee), but also upon economic invulnerability (for which there is no absolute remedy), nuclear-weapon states are impelled to balance superior economic power for security reasons. By recasting balance-of-power theory in light of these assumptions, one can make sense of the great-power politics of the post-Cold War era.en
dc.description.sponsorshipN/Aen
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesGovt Hons Thesisen
dc.rightsThe author retains copyright of this thesis
dc.subjectNeorealismen
dc.subjectBalance-of-power theoryen
dc.subjectSecond-strike nuclear forcesen
dc.subjectMinimum deterrenceen
dc.subjectEconomic poweren
dc.titleSecond-Strike Nuclear Forces and Neorealist Theory: Unit-Level Challenge or Balance-of-Power Politics as Usual?en
dc.typeThesis, Honoursen
dc.description.departmentDepartment of Government and International Relationsen
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Government and International Relationsen


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