Anatomy of State Failure

Abstract

Abstract In the 1990s, failed states emerged as a pernicious threat to both regional security and the wellbeing of millions of people worldwide. While this phenomenon has been welldocumented, explaining why and how states fail has proved to be a complex analytical task. As most scholars have viewed state failure as an anarchic and idiosyncratic occurrence, there has been little attempt to develop theoretical explanations for state failure. This study seeks to reverse this trend. In contrast to existing research, it contends that there was an underlying causal logic to all instances of state failure in the 1990s. To this end, it proposes an analytical model for understanding the causes and the process of state failure in general theoretical terms. There are two main components to this model. First, it claims that four common factors caused state failure in the 1990s: a flawed political structure; an economic crisis; a loss of state legitimacy; and systemic pressures. Second, it argues that the process of state failure represents a profound decrease in and decentralisation of state capital and coercive power. Through a comparative study of state failure in Zaïre, Afghanistan and Yugoslavia, the utility of this model as a theoretical tool for understanding why and how states fail is established.