Self-organizing collections and collective agents
| Field | Value | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | Ismael, Jenann | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2006-12-04 | |
| dc.date.available | 2006-12-04 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2006-12-04 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2123/1323 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Advances in understanding self-organization over the past few decades have led to the temptation to extend it to a model of human cognition. The extension is supported by new insights in situated cognition and success in reproducing quite complex behaviors in robots without any centralized control. Dennett has been a vocal proponent of the extension, repeatedly invoking analogies with self-organizing systems and denying the existence of a self, conceived as an inner locus of information and control. I arguei argue that there is a difference between self-organizing collections and collectives. Only the latter are agents. And this difference is crucial for our understanding of selves. | en |
| dc.format.extent | 62992613 bytes | |
| dc.format.mimetype | audio/mp3 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Minds, Mobs and Memories | en |
| dc.rights | This material is copyright. Other than for the purposes of and subject to the conditions prescribed under the Copyright Act, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be altered, reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission from the University of Sydney Library and/or the appropriate author. | en |
| dc.rights.uri | http://www.usyd.edu.au/disclaimer.shtml | en |
| dc.subject | minds | en |
| dc.subject | mobs | en |
| dc.subject | memories | en |
| dc.subject | ismael | en |
| dc.subject | centre for time | en |
| dc.title | Self-organizing collections and collective agents | en |
| dc.type | Presentation | en_AU |
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