The Specious Present

Abstract

William James characterised the specious present as 'the short duration of which we are immediately and incessantly sensible'. The doctrine that our conscious awareness is not instantaneous, but rather spans a short interval, is rooted in phenomenology. We can directly perceive change and persistence – e.g., a bird swooping, a tone droning – or so it seems; since change and persistence take time, how we could directly apprehend them unless our consciousness also extends through time? However, the doctrine of the specious present strikes some philosophers as highly problematic, even paradoxical. If these philosophers are right, it is hard to see how our consciousness can be as it seems. Hence the importance of this topic. The fact that there are very different conceptions of the specious present – not to mention a lack of consensus concerning how the term itself should be employed – complicates matters considerably. I will survey the main options and try to impose some order on the situation. I will go on to argue that one conception of the specious present is considerably less problematic than the alternatives; this conception is largely, but not completely, Jamesian in character. I will conclude by considering some implications of accepting the specious present in this form for our understanding of time itself.