The Subjectivity of the Present

Abstract

Perhaps the most compelling argument for the tensed theory of time ˜ and in particular the idea of a global monadic present or now ˜ has always been that it is the best explanation of temporal experience. Most detensers admit this, but suggest that other arguments outweigh these considerations. However, it is time detensers rise and fight back on the experiential front as well. Fascinating recent work in the psychology of time perception suggests that the subjective present behaves in surprising ways. The best explanation of these phenomena, I argue, is not that we are responding to a global mind-independent present; rather, the best explanation refers to a (tenseless) temporal integration mechanism in our brains. Coupled with evidence that the subjective present is highly contingent on environmental variables, varies from person to person, and the difficulty of reconciling a global monadic present with our background theories, this argument seriously undermines one‚s confidence that our experience of the present is an experience of time rather than a feature of experience in time.