Two Varieties of Causal Anti-Realism

Abstract

Agency theories of causation have often been criticised for not being sufficiently realist about causation. In my view recent agency theories have not been dialectically effective in addressing this charge. On the one hand there are those such as Huw Price and Peter Menzies, who have appealed to analogies with mind-dependent properties such as secondary qualities (Menzies and Price) and perspectives (Price), have emphasised the experience of agency, and have aimed for reductionòencouraging (despite their disavowals) the view that the agency theory amounts to a kind of subjectivism. On the other hand there are those such as Judea Pearl and Jim Woodward, who in reaction have distanced themselves completely from the centrality of agency (Pearl), or who have sought refuge in non-reductionism, hoping the question of realism can thereby be evaded (Woodward). In this paper I describe a minimal agency view of causation, and place it with respect to issues of realism and anti-realism. I argue that it is confusion over two forms of anti-realism, encouraged by inessential aspects of the mind-dependent analogies, that has seen Pearl and Woodward shy away from endorsing the anti-realist elements in the agency theory.