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dc.contributor.authorGuillén, Pablo
dc.contributor.authorHakimov, Rustamdjan
dc.date.accessioned2014-01-28
dc.date.available2014-01-28
dc.date.issued2014-01-01
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2123/9951
dc.description.abstractWe test the effect of the amount of information on the strategies played by others in the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism. We find that providing limited information on the strategies played by others has a negative and significant effect in truth-telling rates. Subjects report truthfully more often when either full information or no information on the strategies played by others is available. Our results have potentially important implications for the design of markets based on strategy-proof matching algorithms.en_AU
dc.language.isoen_AUen_AU
dc.publisherSchool of Economicsen_AU
dc.relation.ispartofseries2014-01en_AU
dc.titleMonkey see, monkey do: truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of othersen_AU
dc.typeWorking Paperen_AU
dc.contributor.departmentSchool of Economicsen_AU


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