• A classification of bargaining solutions by evolutionary origin 

  Hwang, Sung-Ha; Newton, Jonathan (School of Economics, 2014-01)

  For games of contracting under perturbed best response dynamics, varying the perturbations along two dimensions (uniform vs. logit, directed vs. undirected) gives four possibilities. Three of these select differing major ...

• Monkey see, monkey do: truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others 

  Guillén, Pablo; Hakimov, Rustamdjan (School of Economics, 2014-01)

  We test the effect of the amount of information on the strategies played by others in the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism. We find that providing limited information on the strategies played ...

• Flexible valuations for consumer goods as measured by the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism 

  Tymula, Agnieszka; Woelbert, Eva; Glimcher, Paul (School of Economics, 2013-11)

  Economists have long been interested in mechanisms that lead to truthful revelation of the relative values individuals place on diff erent goods. In this paper we take one of the most popular of such mechanisms, and show ...

• A new solution for the moral hazard problem in team production 

  Guillén, Pablo; Merrett, Danielle; Slonim, Robert (School of Economics, 2013-11)

  We propose an intergroup competition scheme (ICS) to theoretically solve free-riding in team production and provide experimental evidence from a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) public goods game. The ICS includes ...

• Competitive Screening of a Heterogeneous Labor Force and Corporate Teamwork Attitude 

  Tymula, Agnieszka (School of Economics, 2013-11)

  The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of competition on the structure of incentive schemes, workforce composition and the degree of cooperation within firms. We show that in equilibrium high-ability workers, in ...

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