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dc.contributor.authorNewton, Jonathan
dc.contributor.authorSawa, Ryoji
dc.date.accessioned2013-06-21
dc.date.available2013-06-21
dc.date.issued2013-06-01
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2123/9223
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers marriage problems, roommate problems with nonempty core, and college admissions problems with responsive preferences. All stochastically stable matchings are shown to be contained in the set of matchings which are most robust to one-shot deviation.en_AU
dc.language.isoen_AUen_AU
dc.publisherSchool of Economicsen_AU
dc.relation.ispartofseries2013-09en_AU
dc.subjectlearningen_AU
dc.subjectstochastic stabilityen_AU
dc.subjectmatchingen_AU
dc.subjectmarriageen_AU
dc.subjectcollege admissionsen_AU
dc.titleA one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problemsen_AU
dc.typeWorking Paperen_AU
dc.contributor.departmentSchool of Economicsen_AU


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