A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
Field | Value | Language |
dc.contributor.author | Newton, Jonathan | |
dc.contributor.author | Sawa, Ryoji | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-06-21 | |
dc.date.available | 2013-06-21 | |
dc.date.issued | 2013-06-01 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2123/9223 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper considers marriage problems, roommate problems with nonempty core, and college admissions problems with responsive preferences. All stochastically stable matchings are shown to be contained in the set of matchings which are most robust to one-shot deviation. | en_AU |
dc.language.iso | en_AU | en_AU |
dc.publisher | School of Economics | en_AU |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2013-09 | en_AU |
dc.subject | learning | en_AU |
dc.subject | stochastic stability | en_AU |
dc.subject | matching | en_AU |
dc.subject | marriage | en_AU |
dc.subject | college admissions | en_AU |
dc.title | A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems | en_AU |
dc.type | Working Paper | en_AU |
dc.contributor.department | School of Economics | en_AU |
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