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dc.contributor.authorNewton, Jonathan
dc.contributor.authorSawa, Ryoji
dc.date.accessioned2013-06-21
dc.date.available2013-06-21
dc.date.issued2013-06-01
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2123/9223
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers marriage problems, roommate problems with nonempty core, and college admissions problems with responsive preferences. All stochastically stable matchings are shown to be contained in the set of matchings which are most robust to one-shot deviation.en
dc.language.isoen_AUen
dc.publisherSchool of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers Discipline of Economicsen
dc.rightsOther
dc.subjectlearningen
dc.subjectstochastic stabilityen
dc.subjectmatchingen
dc.subjectmarriageen
dc.subjectcollege admissionsen
dc.titleA one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problemsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
usyd.facultyFaculty of Arts and Social Sciences, School of Economics
usyd.departmentSchool of Economicsen
usyd.citation.issue2013-09en


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