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dc.contributor.authorNewton, Jonathan
dc.date.accessioned2013-01-22
dc.date.available2013-01-22
dc.date.issued2013-01-01
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2123/8895
dc.description.abstractThis study considers pure coordination games on networks and the waiting time for an adaptive process of strategic change to achieve efficient coordination. Although it is in the interest of every player to coordinate on a single globally efficient norm, coalitional behavior at a local level can greatly slow, as well as hasten convergence to efficiency. For some networks, when one action becomes efficient enough relative to the other, the effect of coalitional behavior changes abruptly from a conservative effect to a reforming effect. These effects are confirmed for a variety of stylized and empirical social networks found in the literature. For coordination games in which the Pareto efficient and risk dominant equilibria differ, polymorphic states can be the only stochastically stable states.en_AU
dc.language.isoen_AUen_AU
dc.publisherSchool of Economicsen_AU
dc.relation.ispartofseries2013-02en_AU
dc.subjectEvolutionen_AU
dc.subjectStochastic stabilityen_AU
dc.subjectlearningen_AU
dc.subjectcoalitionen_AU
dc.subjectsocial normen_AU
dc.subjectreformen_AU
dc.subjectconservatismen_AU
dc.subjectnetworksen_AU
dc.subjectsocial networksen_AU
dc.titleCoalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolutionen_AU
dc.typeWorking Paperen_AU
dc.contributor.departmentSchool of Economicsen_AU


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