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dc.contributor.authorBel, Roland
dc.contributor.authorSmirnov, Vladimir
dc.contributor.authorWait, Andrew
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-30
dc.date.available2012-11-30
dc.date.issued2012-11-01
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2123/8799
dc.description.abstractA successful organization – or Broadway production – needs the right team. A potential issue is that an existing synergy between complementary agents (or assets) can reduce the marginal return of effort, creating a disincentive to invest. While agents always prefer to be in a team of complementary workers, a principal may wish to use non-complementary agents; this can occur if the loss from lower investment is sufficiently large. A principal, however, may opt for non-complementary agents when complementary workers would produce greater surplus. These insights have implications for job rotation, the central­ization versus decentralization of decision making and mergers.en
dc.language.isoen_AUen
dc.publisherSchool of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers Discipline of Economicsen
dc.rightsOther
dc.subjectcomplementarityen
dc.subjecttask allocationen
dc.subjectjob rotationen
dc.subjectassetsen
dc.subjectmergersen
dc.titleOn Broadway and strip malls: how to make a winning teamen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
usyd.facultyFaculty of Arts and Social Sciences, School of Economics
usyd.citation.issue2012-14en


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