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|Title:||League-Table Incentives and Price Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets|
|Authors:||Cheung, Stephen L.|
School of Economics
|Keywords:||relative performance incentives|
managed funds markets
asset market experiments
|Publisher:||School of Economics|
|Abstract:||We study experimental markets in which participants face incentives modeled upon those prevailing in markets for managed funds. Each participant’s portfolio is periodically evaluated at market value and ranked by their relative performance as measured by short-term paper returns. Those who rank highly attract a larger share of new fund inflows. In an environment in which prices are typically close to intrinsic value, the effect of these incentives is mild. However in an environment in which markets are prone to bubble, mispricing is greatly exacerbated by relative performance incentives, and even becomes more pronounced with experience.|
|Department/Unit/Centre:||School of Economics|
|Type of Work:||Working Paper|
|Appears in Collections:||Working Papers - Economics|
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