Ownership, access and sequential investment

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Open Access

Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Mai, Maxim
dc.contributor.author	Smirnov, Vladimir
dc.contributor.author	Wait, Andrew
dc.date.accessioned	2011-10-24
dc.date.available	2011-10-24
dc.date.issued	2011-10-01
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2123/7862
dc.description.abstract	We extend the property-rights framework to allow for: a separation of the ownership rights of access and veto; and sequential investment. Parties investing first (ex ante) do so before contracting is possible. Parties that invest second (ex post) can contract on (at least some) of their investment costs. Along with this cost-sharing effect, the incentive to invest is affected by a strategic effect generated by sequential investment. Together these effects can overturn some of the predictions of the property-rights literature. For example, the most inclusive ownership structure might not be optimal, even if all investments are complementary.	en
dc.language.iso	en_AU	en
dc.publisher	School of Economics	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working papers Discipline of Economics	en
dc.rights	Other
dc.subject	property rights	en
dc.subject	access	en
dc.subject	veto	en
dc.subject	firm organization	en
dc.subject	sequential investment	en
dc.subject	holdup	en
dc.title	Ownership, access and sequential investment	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en
usyd.faculty	Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, School of Economics
usyd.department	School of Economics	en
usyd.citation.issue	2011-09	en