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dc.contributor.authorVaroufakis, Yanis
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-23
dc.date.available2011-05-23
dc.date.issued1991-08-01
dc.identifier.isbn0867583835
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2123/7427
dc.description.abstractEquilibrium game theory borrows from neoclassical economics its rationality concept which it immediately puts to work in order to produce the basic results it needs for building an elaborate narrative of social interaction. This paper focuses on some recent objections to game theory's use of rationality assumptions in general, and of backward induction and subgame perfection in particular, and interprets them in the light of the postmodern critique of the grand meta-narratives which social theorists often rely on for social explanation. The paper subsequently presents a defence of game theory which seeks to accommodate the postmodern critique. However, it goes on to show that such a defence is illegitimate and claims that the problem lies with the faulty conceptualisation of the main concept on which game theory rests: that of Reason. Having called for a different perception of rationality, the paper pits the postmodern view against Hegelian dialectics and sides with the later.en_AU
dc.language.isoen_AUen_AU
dc.publisherDepartment of Economicsen_AU
dc.relation.ispartofseries162en_AU
dc.titlePostmodern Challenges to Game Theoryen_AU
dc.typeWorking Paperen_AU
dc.contributor.departmentEconomicsen_AU


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