Ethnic Conflict: A Model of Concessions
Access status:
Open Access
Type
Thesis, HonoursAuthor/s
Samuel, ThampapillaiAbstract
The Coase Theorem suggests that the ability of completely informed agents to make transfers should generally avert conflict. This thesis considers a complete information model of ethnic conflict where the dominated group consists of heterogeneous agents, but the dominant group can ...
See moreThe Coase Theorem suggests that the ability of completely informed agents to make transfers should generally avert conflict. This thesis considers a complete information model of ethnic conflict where the dominated group consists of heterogeneous agents, but the dominant group can only bargain with the dominated group as a whole. This broadly captures a political system with race-based parties and coalitions. Moreover in this thesis the dominant group can make credible ex-ante transfers to the dominated group outside a standard bargaining framework. Then conditions arise where conflict occurs.
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See moreThe Coase Theorem suggests that the ability of completely informed agents to make transfers should generally avert conflict. This thesis considers a complete information model of ethnic conflict where the dominated group consists of heterogeneous agents, but the dominant group can only bargain with the dominated group as a whole. This broadly captures a political system with race-based parties and coalitions. Moreover in this thesis the dominant group can make credible ex-ante transfers to the dominated group outside a standard bargaining framework. Then conditions arise where conflict occurs.
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Date
2008-01-01Licence
The author retains copyright of this thesisDepartment, Discipline or Centre
Discipline of EconomicsShare