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|Title:||Ethnic Conflict: A Model of Concessions|
Discipline of Economics
|Abstract:||The Coase Theorem suggests that the ability of completely informed agents to make transfers should generally avert conflict. This thesis considers a complete information model of ethnic conflict where the dominated group consists of heterogeneous agents, but the dominant group can only bargain with the dominated group as a whole. This broadly captures a political system with race-based parties and coalitions. Moreover in this thesis the dominant group can make credible ex-ante transfers to the dominated group outside a standard bargaining framework. Then conditions arise where conflict occurs.|
|Department/Unit/Centre:||Discipline of Economics|
|Rights and Permissions:||The author retains copyright of this thesis|
|Type of Work:||Thesis, Honours|
|Appears in Collections:||Honours Theses|
Honours Theses - School of Economics
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