Designing Incentive Schemes for Public Transport
Field | Value | Language |
dc.contributor.author | Larsen, Odd I. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-07-26 | |
dc.date.available | 2010-07-26 | |
dc.date.issued | 2001-01-01 | |
dc.identifier.citation | International Conference Series on Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport – 2001 – Molde, Norway– Thredbo 7 | en_AU |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2123/6323 | |
dc.description | Workshop D | en_AU |
dc.description.abstract | In 1999 the Hordaland County Council decided that the county should introduce so-called ”quality contracts” for public transport in the county. The main idea of this type of contract is that decisions on the level of service (routes and frequencies) are left to the operators while the fares are subject to regulation by the county. A basic ingredient of such contracts should be a remuneration scheme linked to the level of service. The purpose of the remuneration is to internalise the impacts on consumers’ surplus caused by changes in the level of service. This impact is inadequately captured by the changes in fare revenue. Theory gives some guidance with respect to the principle of proper remuneration. A model was calibrated for each of the three main bus operators in Hordaland and used to estimate the rates of remuneration that would induce the operator to provide an optimum level of service based on maximisation of profit. Modelling indicated that the remuneration schemes should consist for fixed rates per revenue kilometre and vehicle hour of revenue service for basic services and additional peak services respectively. Due to substantial deviation between fare and marginal cost for peak passengers, two operators should also have a remuneration per peak passengers. Modelling also showed that the sum of fare revenue and remuneration per km, hour and peak passenger would imply excessive profits and that the contracts therefor should include the deduction of a fixed amount. This is a novel and promising approach to contracting for public transport services. The heavy reliance on modelling means that the stakeholders must have confidence in the model and the results produced. In year 2000, contracts were implemented in the County of Hordaland based on these principles and results from modelling. | en_AU |
dc.publisher | Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies. Faculty of Economics and Business. The University of Sydney | en_AU |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Thredbo | en_AU |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 7 | en_AU |
dc.rights | Copyright the University of Sydney | en |
dc.title | Designing Incentive Schemes for Public Transport | en_AU |
dc.type | Conference paper | en_AU |
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