The Selection of a Defective Major Premise
Field | Value | Language |
dc.contributor.author | Mohseni, Aryan | |
dc.contributor.author | Gummow, William | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2025-02-14T06:13:50Z | |
dc.date.available | 2025-02-14T06:13:50Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | en_AU |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2123/33637 | |
dc.description.abstract | In a common law system of reasoning, there is no definitive method to identify the correct legal rule, or major premise, from which there proceeds the reasoning to the result. At a more fundamental level, there are also no a priori rules to determine the correct level of generality at which to pitch the scope of that premise. Both remain selective processes which may lead to unsatisfactory outcomes. This is illustrated by our consideration of three recent decisions of courts of final appeal. | en_AU |
dc.language.iso | en | en_AU |
dc.publisher | Australian Bar Review | en_AU |
dc.relation.ispartof | Australian Bar Review | en_AU |
dc.subject | Trustees | en_AU |
dc.subject | Indemnities | en_AU |
dc.subject | Passing off | en_AU |
dc.subject | Trademarks | en_AU |
dc.subject | Intellectual property | en_AU |
dc.subject | Injunctions | en_AU |
dc.subject | Constitutional injunctions | en_AU |
dc.subject | Legal reasoning | en_AU |
dc.subject | Legal theory | en_AU |
dc.subject | Supreme Court of the United Kingdom | en_AU |
dc.subject | High Court of Australia | en_AU |
dc.subject | Privy Council | en_AU |
dc.title | The Selection of a Defective Major Premise | en_AU |
dc.type | Article | en_AU |
dc.type.pubtype | Publisher's version | en_AU |
usyd.faculty | SeS faculties schools::The University of Sydney Law School | en_AU |
usyd.citation.volume | 53 | en_AU |
usyd.citation.spage | 11 | en_AU |
usyd.citation.epage | 20 | en_AU |
workflow.metadata.only | No | en_AU |
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