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dc.contributor.authorMohseni, Aryan
dc.contributor.authorGummow, William
dc.date.accessioned2025-02-14T06:13:50Z
dc.date.available2025-02-14T06:13:50Z
dc.date.issued2023en_AU
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2123/33637
dc.description.abstractIn a common law system of reasoning, there is no definitive method to identify the correct legal rule, or major premise, from which there proceeds the reasoning to the result. At a more fundamental level, there are also no a priori rules to determine the correct level of generality at which to pitch the scope of that premise. Both remain selective processes which may lead to unsatisfactory outcomes. This is illustrated by our consideration of three recent decisions of courts of final appeal.en_AU
dc.language.isoenen_AU
dc.publisherAustralian Bar Reviewen_AU
dc.relation.ispartofAustralian Bar Reviewen_AU
dc.subjectTrusteesen_AU
dc.subjectIndemnitiesen_AU
dc.subjectPassing offen_AU
dc.subjectTrademarksen_AU
dc.subjectIntellectual propertyen_AU
dc.subjectInjunctionsen_AU
dc.subjectConstitutional injunctionsen_AU
dc.subjectLegal reasoningen_AU
dc.subjectLegal theoryen_AU
dc.subjectSupreme Court of the United Kingdomen_AU
dc.subjectHigh Court of Australiaen_AU
dc.subjectPrivy Councilen_AU
dc.titleThe Selection of a Defective Major Premiseen_AU
dc.typeArticleen_AU
dc.type.pubtypePublisher's versionen_AU
usyd.facultySeS faculties schools::The University of Sydney Law Schoolen_AU
usyd.citation.volume53en_AU
usyd.citation.spage11en_AU
usyd.citation.epage20en_AU
workflow.metadata.onlyNoen_AU


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