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dc.contributor.authorMohseni, Aryan
dc.contributor.authorGummow, William
dc.date.accessioned2025-02-14T06:13:50Z
dc.date.available2025-02-14T06:13:50Z
dc.date.issued2023en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2123/33637
dc.description.abstractIn a common law system of reasoning, there is no definitive method to identify the correct legal rule, or major premise, from which there proceeds the reasoning to the result. At a more fundamental level, there are also no a priori rules to determine the correct level of generality at which to pitch the scope of that premise. Both remain selective processes which may lead to unsatisfactory outcomes. This is illustrated by our consideration of three recent decisions of courts of final appeal.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherAustralian Bar Reviewen
dc.relation.ispartofAustralian Bar Reviewen
dc.rightsOtheren
dc.subjectTrusteesen
dc.subjectIndemnitiesen
dc.subjectPassing offen
dc.subjectTrademarksen
dc.subjectIntellectual propertyen
dc.subjectInjunctionsen
dc.subjectConstitutional injunctionsen
dc.subjectLegal reasoningen
dc.subjectLegal theoryen
dc.subjectSupreme Court of the United Kingdomen
dc.subjectHigh Court of Australiaen
dc.subjectPrivy Councilen
dc.titleThe Selection of a Defective Major Premiseen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.type.pubtypePublisher's versionen
usyd.facultySeS faculties schools::The University of Sydney Law Schoolen
usyd.citation.volume53en
usyd.citation.spage11en
usyd.citation.epage20en
workflow.metadata.onlyNoen


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