Something New in Medical Residency Matching Markets
Field | Value | Language |
dc.contributor.author | Yu, Zhuojin | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-01-25T00:31:25Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-01-25T00:31:25Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2023-01-25 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2123/29926 | |
dc.description.abstract | Worldwide medical residency markets commonly employ variants of the two-sided central clearinghouse designed by Roth and Peranson in 1999. In the NSW physiotherapy residency matching market, a one-sided and computationally efficient matching mechanism is used – the Kuhn-Munkres algorithm. The mechanism is new for medical matching markets, with no publicly known application and no existing literature. A crucial contribution of the thesis is presenting the algorithm and starting a discussion around the Kuhn-Munkres algorithm in matching. The thesis models the iterative working of the Kuhn-Munkres algorithm. I show that the Kuhn-Munkres algorithm is rank-efficient, outcome unfair, procedurally fair and not strategy-proof. Comparing the Roth-Peranson and Kuhn-Munkres algorithms on efficiency, fairness and incentive properties, the thesis concludes that there is no settled winner between the two algorithms. The competition eventually comes down to the trade-off between cost reductions and market complexities. | en_AU |
dc.language.iso | en | en_AU |
dc.subject | economics | en_AU |
dc.subject | matching | en_AU |
dc.subject | Kuhn-Munkres algorithm | en_AU |
dc.subject | Munkres algorithm | en_AU |
dc.subject | Hungarian algorithm | en_AU |
dc.subject | medical matching | en_AU |
dc.title | Something New in Medical Residency Matching Markets | en_AU |
dc.type | Thesis | en_AU |
dc.type.thesis | Honours | en_AU |
usyd.faculty | SeS faculties schools::Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences::School of Economics | en_AU |
workflow.metadata.only | No | en_AU |
Associated file/s
Associated collections