Retribution and the Evolution of Human Punishment

Abstract

First lines of the Introduction (as abstract not provided): Social scientists have long considered punishment to be one of the most promising candidates for a ‘human universal’—a pan-cultural behaviour common across all human societies: from tribes of hunter-gatherers, to flourishing industrial civilisations.2 Due its ubiquity, punishment has, in the last decade or so, become a major topic of interest for evolutionary theorists looking to explain the origins of modern human behaviour in terms of natural selection.3 For centuries prior to this, however, philosophers have been questioning the rationale behind punishment. The main philosophical question about punishment is justificatory. Is it morally permissible to punish? And if so, why? There are two main kinds of philosophical answers to this question.4 Consequentialists maintain that punishment is justified because it brings about good consequences.5 And retributivists maintain that punishment is justified because wrongdoers inherently deserve to be punished.6 Recent psychological evidence suggests that people endorse both retributivism and consequentialism in principle. But in practice, experiments have shown people are motivated to punish solely for retributive concerns, and by strong emotional reactions to wrongdoing.7