On Moral Hedging, the Problem of Intertheoretic Value Comparisons, and Vagueness

Abstract

First lines of the Introduction (as abstract not provided): When we are confronted with decisions of moral significance, the ideal course of action, at least according to most moral philosophers, is to look to the moral theory to which we subscribe for guidance, and act in accordance with that guidance as best we can. This process functions well for those who are quite certain that their preferred moral theory is correct, or at least believe that it is sufficient to guide their actions without doubt. There are, however, those of us who are genuinely uncertain as to which moral theory is correct and most accurately tracks morality. Different moral theories make different judgments about the value of each action, the value of each outcome, whether a certain act is permissible or impermissible, or whether a certain act is merely permissible or supererogatory. Depending on which moral theory we subscribe to, the actions we are morally obliged to take may differ substantially, putting agents who are genuinely uncertain as to which moral theory is correct in a difficult situation whenever they are called to make a decision about which the moral theories to which they lend at least some credence disagree. Call this type of uncertainty normative uncertainty.