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dc.contributor.authorDempsey, Patrick
dc.date.accessioned2014-04-01
dc.date.available2014-04-01
dc.date.issued2013-01-01
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2123/10247
dc.description.abstractIt has been alleged that Presentism is incompatible with our most fundamental physics. More specifically, it is argued that this follows from the fact that Presentism and The Special Theory of Relativity are incompatible. The aim of this thesis is to assess whether the Presentist can refute this argument. I shall argue that whilst it is problematic for the Presentist to dispute the claim that their theory is incompatible with The Special Theory of Relativity, they can successfully refute the argument that their theory is therefore incompatible with our most fundamental theories of physics. My conclusion will be that, as it stands, there is no sound argument to suggest Presentism is incompatible with our most fundamental physics. This thesis provides a case study of the interplay between metaphysical and physical theories.en_AU
dc.language.isoen_AUen_AU
dc.rightsThe author retains copyright of this thesisen_AU
dc.subjectPresentismen_AU
dc.subjectQuantum Gravityen_AU
dc.subjectPhysicsen_AU
dc.subjectMetaphysicsen_AU
dc.subjectSpecial Theory of Relativityen_AU
dc.subjectTimeen_AU
dc.titleOn the Compatibility of Presentism and our most fundamental Physics.en_AU
dc.typeThesis, Honoursen_AU
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_AU


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