Descartes’ Developmental Theory of Mind
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Type
ThesisThesis type
Doctor of PhilosophyAuthor/s
Nicolls Small, LucindaAbstract
Descartes is famous for his claim that the essence of soul is thought, and that there is nothing in the mind of which we are in no way conscious. This has the controversial implication that we are always thinking and in some respect conscious of our thoughts, from our earliest ...
See moreDescartes is famous for his claim that the essence of soul is thought, and that there is nothing in the mind of which we are in no way conscious. This has the controversial implication that we are always thinking and in some respect conscious of our thoughts, from our earliest moments in the womb to our final moments in life. Nonetheless, Descartes acknowledges a substantive difference between infant and adult cognitive experience. While Cartesian infants are always thinking, they cannot ‘meditate upon metaphysics’ and cannot entertain ‘pure intellections’. But if infants and adults are on a par in possessing minds and therefore thought, what explains this difference? This question is my overarching focus in this thesis. Through a close examination of Descartes’ discussions of infant and adult thought, I seek to establish the main source of the cognitive differences between infants and adults. I maintain that Descartes’ account is surprisingly nuanced given the elliptical nature of these discussions. The difference between infant and adult cognitive experience rests primarily on a difference in attentional capacity. Cartesian infants experience a generalised attentional deficit that prevents their engaging in certain forms of higher-order thinking—for instance, that required to ‘meditate on metaphysics’. This attentional deficit arises both in the undeveloped nature of the infant body, which exerts a distracting influence on the infant mind, and the inexperienced infant mind, which is less accustomed to responding to the body and performing its various intellectual operations. My examination of the difference between infant and adult cognitive experience supports two overarching theses. First, that Descartes presents us with a rudimentary implicit theory of attention. This encompasses both a descriptive account of how attention operates and a normative account of how attention should ideally be directed in order to successfully engage in the ‘search for truth’. Second, that Descartes presents an implicit developmental theory of mind through his account of infant and adult cognitive experience. This developmental theory of mind has two main aspects: the transition from infancy to adulthood, and the cultivation of reason and reflective attention in adulthood. Through exercising our minds in accordance with his method, Descartes maintains that we can develop our powers of reasoning and, moreover, cultivate a ‘clear and attentive mind’ (mens pura et attenta). This requires that we direct the mind’s attention to the proper objects, in the proper order, in accordance with the proper method. With concerted intellectual practice over time, we can cultivate an attentive mind capable of discerning the truth.
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See moreDescartes is famous for his claim that the essence of soul is thought, and that there is nothing in the mind of which we are in no way conscious. This has the controversial implication that we are always thinking and in some respect conscious of our thoughts, from our earliest moments in the womb to our final moments in life. Nonetheless, Descartes acknowledges a substantive difference between infant and adult cognitive experience. While Cartesian infants are always thinking, they cannot ‘meditate upon metaphysics’ and cannot entertain ‘pure intellections’. But if infants and adults are on a par in possessing minds and therefore thought, what explains this difference? This question is my overarching focus in this thesis. Through a close examination of Descartes’ discussions of infant and adult thought, I seek to establish the main source of the cognitive differences between infants and adults. I maintain that Descartes’ account is surprisingly nuanced given the elliptical nature of these discussions. The difference between infant and adult cognitive experience rests primarily on a difference in attentional capacity. Cartesian infants experience a generalised attentional deficit that prevents their engaging in certain forms of higher-order thinking—for instance, that required to ‘meditate on metaphysics’. This attentional deficit arises both in the undeveloped nature of the infant body, which exerts a distracting influence on the infant mind, and the inexperienced infant mind, which is less accustomed to responding to the body and performing its various intellectual operations. My examination of the difference between infant and adult cognitive experience supports two overarching theses. First, that Descartes presents us with a rudimentary implicit theory of attention. This encompasses both a descriptive account of how attention operates and a normative account of how attention should ideally be directed in order to successfully engage in the ‘search for truth’. Second, that Descartes presents an implicit developmental theory of mind through his account of infant and adult cognitive experience. This developmental theory of mind has two main aspects: the transition from infancy to adulthood, and the cultivation of reason and reflective attention in adulthood. Through exercising our minds in accordance with his method, Descartes maintains that we can develop our powers of reasoning and, moreover, cultivate a ‘clear and attentive mind’ (mens pura et attenta). This requires that we direct the mind’s attention to the proper objects, in the proper order, in accordance with the proper method. With concerted intellectual practice over time, we can cultivate an attentive mind capable of discerning the truth.
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Date
2022Rights statement
The author retains copyright of this thesis. It may only be used for the purposes of research and study. It must not be used for any other purposes and may not be transmitted or shared with others without prior permission.Faculty/School
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, School of HumanitiesDepartment, Discipline or Centre
PhilosophyAwarding institution
The University of SydneyShare