A New Method to Solve Zero-Sum Games under Moment Conditions

Abstract

When only the moments (mean, variance or t-th moment) of the underline distribution are known, numerous max-min optimization models can be interpreted as a zero-sum game, in which the decision maker (DM) chooses actions to maximize her expected profit while Adverse Nature chooses a distribution subject to the moments conditions to minimize DM’s expected profit. We propose a new method to efficiently solve this class of zero-sum games under moment conditions. By applying the min-max inequality, our method reformulates the zero-sum game as a robust moral hazard model, in which Adverse Nature chooses both the distribution and actions to minimize DM’s expected profit subject to incentive compatibility (IC) constraints. Under quasi-concavity, these IC constraints are replaced by the first-order conditions, which give rise to extra moment constraints. Interestingly, these extra moment constraints drastically reduce the number of corner points to be considered in the corresponding semi-infinite programming models. We show that in the equilibrium, these moment constraints are binding but have zero Lagrangian multipliers and thus facilitate closed-form solutions in several application examples with different levels of complexity. The high efficiency of the method enables us to solve a large class of zero-sum games and the corresponding max-min robust optimization models.