Fairness as Stability: Rawls, Schmitt and the Contemporary Crisis of Liberal Democracy

Abstract

In 2019, liberal democracies around the world are experiencing a crisis of antagonism, as mutually hostile groups threaten to undermine democratic stability. Drawing on the political theories of Carl Schmitt and John Rawls, this thesis identifies the possibility of a liberal response. Schmitt’s critique of liberalism is addressed with reference to Rawls’s arguments for the stability of a well-ordered society as expressed in Political Liberalism (1993). Rawls’s account of moral psychology, which forms the basis for the overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, is proposed as a compelling response to those affirming unreasonable doctrines. The contemporary crisis is explained as a failure of reciprocity resulting from the neglect of Rawls’s “difference principle”. This neglect has encouraged citizens to affirm unreasonable doctrines within mutually exclusive and hostile associations. I suggest that a Rawlsian response based on the broad acceptance of justice as fairness as the basis of a modus vivendi is both possible and necessary.