Adaptive Preference Formation & Autonomy: Moving towards Respect

Abstract

First lines of the Introduction (as abstract not provided): This thesis seeks to primarily answer the following question: are adapted preferences autonomous? In pursuing the answer of this question, I am unsurprisingly faced with two importantly related queries: firstly, what actually is adaptive preference formation? And secondly, what kind of theory of autonomy is correct and why? In the spirit of question answering, the first chapter of this thesis seeks to provide a more robust account of adaptive preference formation (herein APF), a theory which states that the preferences held by an agent can be subconsciously causally produced by the restriction of options. Through an examination of Jon Elster’s original account of the concept, and a consideration of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s contemporary interpretations of Elster’s account, I intend to flesh out the mechanics of APF, considering the necessary and sufficient conditions for APF. This section aims to solidify the descriptive literature of APF, with a focus on differentiating the process from other similar concepts such as character planning and internalised oppression (herein IO). Ultimately, I conclude with a variation of Elster’s account and produce my own examples of agents who hold adapted preferences (herein AP).