The effect of difficulty manipulation on confidence in causal strength judgments
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Type
ThesisThesis type
Masters by ResearchAuthor/s
Cyrzon, ChadAbstract
Petrusic and Baranski (2009) concluded that confidence is a general property of human judgment. However the claim may be premature, as there is a lack of enquiry into how confidence affects causal strength judgements. Within this domain, a complete account of empirical estimates ...
See morePetrusic and Baranski (2009) concluded that confidence is a general property of human judgment. However the claim may be premature, as there is a lack of enquiry into how confidence affects causal strength judgements. Within this domain, a complete account of empirical estimates of causal strength has remained a challenge for the two dominant normative models, namely; the co-variational model, and Power PC theory. But the conflation hypothesis, posited by Liljeholm and Cheng (2009), suggests that the co-variational model may actually be an account of participants' conflating confidence with estimates of causal strength; if probed separately, and given a less ambiguous task scenario, the two should be dissociable, and empirical strength estimates should accord with Power PC. Although, if confidence is a general property of human judgement, the conflation hypothesis could be extended to incorporate the most robust finding within the broader literature on decisional confidence - the difficulty (hard-easy) effect: the general tendency for participants’ subjective estimates to exceed objective probability for hard decisions, and to underestimate objective probability for easy decisions. Our aim is to assess the predictions of the two normative accounts of causal strength estimates, as well as formulate hypotheses for how the difficulty effect may effect causal strength judgements, using a modification of a previous causal strength task. We were able to remove a prior bias in previous tasks, and while the two models could partially explain different aspects of strength responses, participants' consistently rated the strength of preventive stimuli higher than generative stimuli, particularly in smaller sample sizes when these judgements were more difficult to make. We suggest this constitutes evidence of the difficulty effect in empirical causal strength judgements, and suggest how the finding may be related to more recent Bayesian models of strength judgement.
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See morePetrusic and Baranski (2009) concluded that confidence is a general property of human judgment. However the claim may be premature, as there is a lack of enquiry into how confidence affects causal strength judgements. Within this domain, a complete account of empirical estimates of causal strength has remained a challenge for the two dominant normative models, namely; the co-variational model, and Power PC theory. But the conflation hypothesis, posited by Liljeholm and Cheng (2009), suggests that the co-variational model may actually be an account of participants' conflating confidence with estimates of causal strength; if probed separately, and given a less ambiguous task scenario, the two should be dissociable, and empirical strength estimates should accord with Power PC. Although, if confidence is a general property of human judgement, the conflation hypothesis could be extended to incorporate the most robust finding within the broader literature on decisional confidence - the difficulty (hard-easy) effect: the general tendency for participants’ subjective estimates to exceed objective probability for hard decisions, and to underestimate objective probability for easy decisions. Our aim is to assess the predictions of the two normative accounts of causal strength estimates, as well as formulate hypotheses for how the difficulty effect may effect causal strength judgements, using a modification of a previous causal strength task. We were able to remove a prior bias in previous tasks, and while the two models could partially explain different aspects of strength responses, participants' consistently rated the strength of preventive stimuli higher than generative stimuli, particularly in smaller sample sizes when these judgements were more difficult to make. We suggest this constitutes evidence of the difficulty effect in empirical causal strength judgements, and suggest how the finding may be related to more recent Bayesian models of strength judgement.
See less
Date
2016-10-07Licence
The author retains copyright of this thesis. It may only be used for the purposes of research and study. It must not be used for any other purposes and may not be transmitted or shared with others without prior permission.Faculty/School
Sydney Medical SchoolAwarding institution
The University of SydneyShare