Hypothesis of Extended Cognition; Problems with Functionalism and Language

Abstract

Clark and Chalmers’ theory of Extended Mind is motivated to explain active externalism with functionalist credentials. I will argue that this fails due to the incompleteness of functionalism. Functionalism is incomplete as a theory of mind in three respects. First it fails to differentiate between the myriad of mental states that may be occurring within an organism during some cognitive processing, making functional parity between the internal and external difficult. Second, empirical functionalism typically requires the inputs to and the outputs from the central nervous system to be defined. Empirical functionalism with such a constraint cannot apply those criteria to external phenomena such as notebooks or computers or anything that does not have a central nervous system. Third is the conflicted issue of functionalism’s inability to explain qualia. This third aspect of functionalism requires acknowledgement even though it does not affect Clark and Chalmers’ EM. Clark and Chalmers’ theory specifically excludes consciousness from extended states. Conscious states are not committed to functionalism being complete. If functionalism were unqualifiedly true, then the fact that some external states play some of the functional roles constitutive of mental states would be enough to guarantee that HEC is true. But I will argue that the incompleteness of functionalism suggests that in the case of intentional states, only the necessity, not the sufficiency of these causal roles is indubitable. In which case the burden of proof must come from Clark and Chalmers to show that the external contributors to the cognitive process are indeed cognitive. Clark and Chalmers claim human language as an example of EM. I will argue that human language is a developmental process. Human language fails as an example of Clark and Chalmers’ theory of EM and as such it is not an example of active externalism.