The Memory of Virtue: Immortality and Kleos in Plato’s Symposium

Abstract

This thesis concerns the presentation of immortality in Plato’s Symposium, a presentation that is unique in Plato’s corpus. Unlike the discussion of immortality in other dialogues, which detail ‘psychic models’ of post-mortem fate (i.e., regarding the soul), the Symposium offers for our consideration what I call a ‘kleos model’ of post-mortem fate, which concerns the immortality that is won through remembrance. The central claim of this presentation is Diotima’s suggestion that people gain immortality through preserving “the memory of their virtue” (208d5-6) long after their death, with a particular emphasis on logoi as a medium for preservation. In this thesis I argue that the presentation of immortality in the Symposium is significantly more complex than has hitherto been recognised. My main contributions here are twofold: First, I establish that the presentation of immortality in the Symposium draws on and extends an already established tradition of post-mortem fate, and that the dialogue cannot be understood properly without an awareness of this tradition. And second, I argue that immortality of the kind detailed above is not an issue that is raised only in Socrates’ speech (as most scholars suggest), but rather that it is a theme that infuses the dialogue as a whole. In the first part of the thesis I trace the history of the ‘kleos tradition’ of post-mortem fate from its origins in Homer (Chapter 1), through the philosophical tradition, with a particular emphasis on Heraclitus (Chapter 2). In Chapter 1 I argue that Homeric man has a Janus-faced attitude towards kleos, as by winning kleos he is able to extend his existence in the world, though only as an object of memory, but in doing so he must sacrifice that which is otherwise most valuable to him, his life. In Chapter 2 I discuss Heraclitus’ critique of the Homeric understanding of kleos in F.29, and argue that at the core of this critique is the idea that Homer payed insufficient attention to the realities of flux. F.29 draws into question the possibility of any meaningful preservation of kleos over time. In the second part I discuss the presentation of immortality in the Symposium. I begin with an analysis of Phaedrus’ discussion of immortality, which, I suggest, through its confusion of eschatological traditions, serves as an introduction to Diotima’s account of immortality through memory. I then consider Diotima’s account itself, and detail her treatment of the key concepts of memory, virtue, and logoi. I argue that this account is in many ways highly idealised, as it details how a person can achieve the preservation of the memory of their virtue as if the process was unproblematic. I then widen the discussion to consider various elements of the dialogue that extend Diotima’s account concerning the preservation of memory in various ways. Here I consider two issues concerning, first the reception of logoi, and second, the transmission of logoi, and the problems these present for their lover in their enterprise of winning immortality. I focus on these issues particularly because, I argue, underlying each is a commitment to the flux of logoi that reflects Heraclitus’ own critique of the kleos tradition. In the third part of the thesis I then consider the presentation of immortality in the Symposium on a compositional level, as a logos created by Plato. Here I consider two matters. First, I argue that the Symposium’s account of immortality is self-referential, in that the dialogue is a logos that preserves the memory of virtue, not only of Socrates, but also of Plato. And second, I consider the place of the account of immortality within Socrates’ wider corpus. I reject the idea that Plato is doctrinally committed to the model of immortality that he presents in the Symposium, suggesting instead that Plato appeals to the kleos tradition as a protreptic device to win his readers’ commitment to the philosophical life.