Epistemology and the Ethics of Homeopathy: a Response to Freckelton

Abstract

The death of two patients in the care of Australian homœopaths is undeniably tragic and reflects poorly on the homœopathic profession at large. While Freckelton admits that it is not fair to judge a profession by its worst practitioners, this is precisely what he has done. If the same argument were applied to all Australian hospitals, in which there are an estimated 18,000 deaths each year due to adverse events or medical errors, then the public could be expected to lose confidence in conventional medicine. Generalising risk by citing extreme examples does not facilitate healthy debate or consideration of the deeper epistemological and ethical issues. While addressing Freckelton's valid concerns, we believe that the appropriate practice of homœopathy is epistemologically robust, ethical and empirically sound. Furthermore, while debate continues on definitions of evidence and the appropriate delivery of health care, we argue that the deliberate exclusion of certain forms of evidence, including positive patient outcomes measured according to different quantitative and qualitative criteria, inappropriately constrains individuals' rights to select models and methods of health care according to their values and to the goals that they wish to achieve.