Why acquiesce? Worker reproductive parasitism in the Eastern honey bee (Apis cerana)

Abstract

Most societies are vulnerable to rogue individuals that pursue their own interests at the expense of the collective entity. Societies often protect themselves from selfish behaviour by 'policing', thereby enforcing the interests of the collective over those of individuals. In insect societies, for example, selfish workers can activate their ovaries and lay eggs, exploiting the collective brood rearing system for individual benefit. Policing, usually in the form of oophagy of worker-laid eggs, controls selfish behaviour. Importantly, once an effective system of policing has evolved, the incentive for personal reproduction is lost, and 'reproductive acquiescence' in which ovary activation is rare or absent is predicted to evolve. Studies of social Hymenoptera have largely supported the prediction of worker 'acquiescence'; workers of most species where policing is well developed have inactive ovaries. However, the Eastern honey bee Apis cerana appears to be an exception. A. cerana colonies are characterised by highly efficient policing, yet about 5% of workers have active ovaries, even when a queen is present. This suggests that the evolution of acquiescence is incomplete in A. cerana. We regularly sampled male eggs and pupae from four A. cerana colonies. Workers had high levels of ovary activation overall (11.7%), and 3.8% of assignable male eggs and 1.1% of assignable male pupae were worker-laid. We conclude that workers with active ovaries lay their eggs, but these rarely survive to pupation because of intense policing. We then used our findings as well as previously published data on A. cerana and A. mellifera to redo the meta-analysis on which reproductive acquiescence theory is based. Including data on both species did not affect the relationship between effectiveness of policing and levels of worker reproduction. Their inclusion did, however, seriously weaken the relationship between relatedness among workers and levels of worker reproduction. Our work thus suggests that relatedness among workers does not affect the probability that workers will attempt to reproduce, but that it is coercion by peers that limits worker reproduction.