A Liberal Theory of Federalism

Abstract

From the European Wars of Religion to post-colonial independence struggles, and on to calls for minority rights and freedoms in Tibet, Kurdistan and beyond, liberals have always been moved by the desires of different individuals to live by different mores and systems of government. By offering a liberal theory of federalism that can equip us with both an account of legitimacy and an institutional structure capable of effectively navigating the diversity endemic to human society, this thesis seeks to carry forward the liberal project of doing justice to what John Rawls famously called “the fact of pluralism.” The liberal theory of federalism rests on a minimalist conception of liberalism, which holds that individuals should be free to live as they see fit, provided they do not stop others from living as they see fit. This in turn yields an account of legitimacy according to which any institutional structure whatsoever is legitimate, with the sole proviso that it not stop individuals from living as they see fit. This thesis fashions minimalist liberalism into a direct justification of the defining strengths of federal systems. By constitutionally enshrining constituent unit autonomy, federal systems are able to both protect negative liberty and promote democratic accountability. The liberal theory of federalism does not shy away from acknowledging that there is no guarantee that any given federal system will realise the liberal goal of doing justice to the fact of pluralism. Nonetheless, federalism offers the hope of a more perfect union between institutional structures and how individuals would like to live: As a means of limiting centralised power and giving more political autonomy to sub-state groups, federalism is another constitutional tool for ensuring that, as Benjamin Constant might have put it, the interests of individuals are “united when they are the same, balanced when they are different, but known and felt in all cases.”