Transcendental-Phenomenological Proof and Descriptive Metaphysics
| Field | Value | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | Clugston, Byron | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2010-01-25 | |
| dc.date.available | 2010-01-25 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-01-25 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2123/5823 | |
| dc.description | Master of Philosophy | en |
| dc.description.abstract | Following P.F. Strawson's reading of Kant, the majority of the literature on transcendental arguments seeks to divorce such arguments from their original Kantian context. This thesis is concerned with Mark Sacks's recent defence of transcendental arguments, which takes a different approach. A critique is given of Sacks's work and extensions and modifications of his approach are recommended. It is proposed that certain difficulties encountered by Kant's transcendentally-ideal approach can be overcome with Hegelian solutions. | en |
| dc.rights | The author retains copyright of this thesis | |
| dc.rights.uri | http://www.library.usyd.edu.au/copyright.html | |
| dc.subject | Kant | en |
| dc.subject | Hegel | en |
| dc.subject | Epistemology | en |
| dc.subject | Transcendental Arguments | en |
| dc.subject | P.F. Strawson | en |
| dc.subject | Phenomenology | en |
| dc.title | Transcendental-Phenomenological Proof and Descriptive Metaphysics | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | en |
| dc.date.valid | 2009-01-01 | en |
| dc.type.thesis | Masters by Research | en |
| usyd.faculty | Faculty of Arts | en |
| usyd.department | Department of Philosophy | en |
| usyd.degree | Master of Philosophy M.Phil | en |
| usyd.awardinginst | The University of Sydney | en |
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