Binding Time - A Theory of How Flexible and Adaptive Temporal Integration Shapes Perception
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Open Access
Type
ThesisThesis type
Doctor of PhilosophyAuthor/s
Pedersen, RasmusAbstract
This thesis develops a theory of temporal binding, the perceptual process via which we temporally
integrate sensory features. While psychophysical and neurophysiological findings have revealed
much about temporal binding, no existing theory adequately account for its adaptability ...
See moreThis thesis develops a theory of temporal binding, the perceptual process via which we temporally integrate sensory features. While psychophysical and neurophysiological findings have revealed much about temporal binding, no existing theory adequately account for its adaptability and flexibility, or how it connects to our temporal phenomenology more broadly. This thesis addresses these gaps. Chapter 1 identifies three explanatory problems a theory of temporal binding must address. It must: (i) account for the many variables that influence temporal binding, (ii) address what I dub the problems of neural delay and desynchronisation, and (iii) explicate how the mechanisms underlying temporal binding relate to our phenomenology. Chapter 2 argues that brain time theories, which take temporal binding to result from synchrony in neural processing, fail to address problems (i) and (ii). In response, I develop a novel ‘hybrid theory’ of temporal binding in Chapter 3. According to this theory, temporal integration relies on how predictive processing and retrodictive processing are modulated by attention. This theory addresses (i) and (ii) by presenting temporal binding as a flexible, adaptive process sensitive to goals, expectations, and actions. Chapter 4 sets out how the hybrid theory addresses (iii), i.e., explains how our unified perceptual experiences of time arise from the fragmented mechanisms underlying time perception. I argue that the phenomenology of temporal unity is imposed through attentional modulation of predictive and retrodictive processing. A series of deflationary claims follow from this. Finally, Chapter 5 presents a framework for empirically testing the hybrid theory's predictions. I explore three hypotheses about how temporal binding phenomenology depends on attention, introduce new animations to test them, and conclude by proposing ways in which we subjectively inflate the phenomenological richness of our experiences of temporal binding.
See less
See moreThis thesis develops a theory of temporal binding, the perceptual process via which we temporally integrate sensory features. While psychophysical and neurophysiological findings have revealed much about temporal binding, no existing theory adequately account for its adaptability and flexibility, or how it connects to our temporal phenomenology more broadly. This thesis addresses these gaps. Chapter 1 identifies three explanatory problems a theory of temporal binding must address. It must: (i) account for the many variables that influence temporal binding, (ii) address what I dub the problems of neural delay and desynchronisation, and (iii) explicate how the mechanisms underlying temporal binding relate to our phenomenology. Chapter 2 argues that brain time theories, which take temporal binding to result from synchrony in neural processing, fail to address problems (i) and (ii). In response, I develop a novel ‘hybrid theory’ of temporal binding in Chapter 3. According to this theory, temporal integration relies on how predictive processing and retrodictive processing are modulated by attention. This theory addresses (i) and (ii) by presenting temporal binding as a flexible, adaptive process sensitive to goals, expectations, and actions. Chapter 4 sets out how the hybrid theory addresses (iii), i.e., explains how our unified perceptual experiences of time arise from the fragmented mechanisms underlying time perception. I argue that the phenomenology of temporal unity is imposed through attentional modulation of predictive and retrodictive processing. A series of deflationary claims follow from this. Finally, Chapter 5 presents a framework for empirically testing the hybrid theory's predictions. I explore three hypotheses about how temporal binding phenomenology depends on attention, introduce new animations to test them, and conclude by proposing ways in which we subjectively inflate the phenomenological richness of our experiences of temporal binding.
See less
Date
2026Rights statement
The author retains copyright of this thesis. It may only be used for the purposes of research and study. It must not be used for any other purposes and may not be transmitted or shared with others without prior permission.Faculty/School
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, School of HumanitiesDepartment, Discipline or Centre
Discipline of PhilosophyAwarding institution
The University of SydneyShare