The Self-Defence Justification of Homicide

Abstract

This is an essay in applied philosophy which addresses an important, comparatively neglected issue of applied ethics. The primary aim of the thesis is to set out the principles related to justified self-defensive homicide. Private self-defence is discussed as a moral and legal justification of homicide, and as an exception to, rather than a justified infringement of, a general prohibition of homicide. The nature of genuinely self-defensive force is discussed. The claim that genuinely self-defensive homicide is always unintended killing is rejected. Also, it is argued, the conditions of necessary and proportionate force, together with lack of intention to kill, are insufficient to justify self-preferential killing. The justification of self-preferential killing in the case of self-defence is grounded in the nature of the act: that is, in the fact that the act is defensive, the warding off of a threat. The use of self—defensive force is not essentially a punitive act, nor is it essentially an attempt to bring about optimal results. The light of self-defence is characterized as a right to use necessary and proportionate force in defending oneself against an unjust threat. This right is part of a broader permission to use necessary and proportionate force directly to block the imminent infliction of irreparable unjust harm. The right of self-defence is exceptionless but not absolute. Necessary and proportionate self-defensive force against an unjust threat does not inflict an injustice on a person who him- or herself constitutes the threat. But wider moral considerations can make use of self—defensive force morally unjustified in some circumstances.