Seeing one another as equals: which disparities of regard are incompatible with egalitarian social relations?

Abstract

Which disparities of regard are objectionable from the point of view of equality, and why? I argue that many disparities of regard are objectionable not because they constitute objectionable treatment per se, but because of the way of seeing one another that they reflect. After outlining the idea of a disparity of regard (§1.1), I argue that contemporary relational egalitarian accounts are generally grounded in the idea of respect for persons, developed in terms of a (comprehensive or political) liberal conception of the person (§1.2). This underpins the idea that disparities of regard are objectionable because they undermine self-respect and self-esteem (§2.1), or because they are incompatible with civic friendship (§2.2). I introduce a range of intuitively objectionable cases which cannot be captured by the foregoing approaches (§3.1). I then consider the idea that disparities of regard are objectionable insofar as they constitute hierarchies of status (§3.2). The most influential version of this approach fails, centrally because it relies on an unspecified idea of merit. In the fourth chapter I defend my own substantive account of seeing one another as equals (§4.1) and the valuable egalitarian social relation this constitutes (§4.2).