An Analysis and Defence of the Two-Dimensional Zombie Argument

Abstract

This thesis presents an analysis and defence of the two-dimensional zombie argument against physicalism by David Chalmers (2009). Put simply, the zombie argument uses the conceivability of zombies in an attempt to defeat physicalism, where zombies are physical duplicates of humans that lack consciousness and physicalism is the thesis that everything is either physical or supervenes on the physical. Despite the zombie argument being one of the most influential contemporary anti-physicalist arguments, the two-dimensional zombie argument, which is a refined version of the original zombie argument, remains relatively unknown among philosophers. In this thesis, I aim to clarify the two-dimensional zombie argument and defend it against four of the recent objections. The thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 is dedicated to introducing the two-dimensional zombie argument and elucidating the key concepts involved in the argument. Chapter 2 aims to provide an overall summary of the past discussions of the argument by mentioning the major objections made to the argument and defences against these objections. In Chapter 3, I provide detailed defences against objections mentioned in three of the more recent papers: one by Phillip Goff and David Papineau (2014); one by Daniel Stoljar (2020); and one by Eugen Fischer and Justin Sytsma (2021). In Chapter 4, I share my speculations on how language and intuitions might be the roots of many disputes over the argument and how further progress could be made. At the end, I conclude that the two-dimensional zombie argument, despite the large number of objections to it, remains in a highly defensible position. Once the argument is properly understood, there seems to be a lack of knockdown objections. At the same time, further progress can still be made by eliminating verbal misunderstandings and attempting to justify the intuitions involved.