Demarcation Problems for Meta-Theories

Abstract

The general aim of this thesis is to contribute to the discussion about the problem of Creeping Minimalism. The problem, as James Dreier (2004) introduced it, is that moral expressivism seems to lose its distinctiveness from moral realism when expressivists adopt minimalism to vindicate moral language in everyday discourses. In particular, the thesis argues two claims. The first claim is that the problem of Creeping Minimalism has no satisfactory solution in the literature so far, and it is unlikely that a satisfactory solution will be forthcoming. The second claim is that the problem of Creeping Minimalism is an instance of a more general problem, what I call the demarcation problem, for various mainstream meta-theories. The demarcation problem for a meta-theory is the problem that the demarcation made by that meta-theory between so-called ‘realist’ and ‘anti-realist’ discourses is trivialised in a global minimalist semantics. Meta-theories that face the demarcation problem include non-cognitivism, error theory, deflationism, epistemic pessimism, and possibly many more. Responses to the problem of Creeping Minimalism are categorised into three types. First, those that attempt to avoid the problem by rejecting minimalism once and for all; second, those that seek to avoid the problem by only partially accepting minimalism; and third, those that seek to solve the problem by reinterpreting expressivism within a global minimalist semantics. All three types of responses are unsatisfactory, and it is highly unlikely that any of them will eventually lead to a satisfactory solution. The demarcation problem for a meta-theory is lightweight if the triviality of its discriminative power is merely conditional: that is, the demarcation made by the meta-theory is trivial if advocates of that meta-theory adopt a global minimalist semantics. By contrast, a demarcation problem for a meta-theory is heavyweight if its advocates also have sufficient reasons to adopt a global minimalist semantics. I argue that mainstream meta-theories – including non-cognitivism, error theory, deflationism and epistemic pessimism – face at least lightweight demarcation problems, and, moreover, it is highly likely that those demarcation problems are heavyweight.