Towards a Model of Large Network Cooperation

Abstract

An insurgency is a clandestine movement seeking to overthrow a government using a combination of violence, intimidation, and peaceful means. Defeating an insurgency requires re-shaping the civilian social networks within which the insurgency is operating. Over the last 70 years, attempts by militaries and other government agencies to do this have often been counterproductive, destroying trust and generated conflict. Infrastructure projects have been used to provide a context for network development and shaping activities, but they carry a high risk of corruption and fraud. This research develops a model of large network cooperation (LNC) that partially explains why some contemporary counterinsurgency tactics and strategies fail. It is proposed large network cooperation emerges when a Central Organisation offers a Membership Contract that is a simple, valuable, and offered indiscriminately to all Potential Members. Additionally, the Central Organisation should have strong ties to its potential competitors and implementation of Membership Contracts should be facilitated by Decentralised Decision Makers, who should not negotiate or change the contract. The architecture and membership of the network should evolve through many short iterations and the network must be subject to constant testing. The model is validated using qualitative case study research. Evidence suggests that the Provincial Reconstruction Teams – the primary tactical units employed by the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan – have been relatively unsuccessful because several of the program’s fundamental assumptions undermine LNC. Conversely, evidence suggests that the National Solidarity Program – a government infrastructure program in Afghanistan – is relatively successful because it more closely resembles the proposed model. The research contributes to the fields of Defence and National Security, Social Network Analysis, Economics, and Organisational Science.