The Primacy of Narrative Agency: A Feminist Theory of the Self

Abstract

Current debates in feminist theory struggle to retain a robust concept of agency in light of the rejection of an independent and sovereign subject. The purpose of my project is to articulate a feminist concept of agency for a self that is relational and non-sovereign (i.e. one that does not equate agency with autonomy) and yet one that remains committed to a conception of the self as both powerful and unique. Narrative agency, which I understand as the capacity to say 'I' over time and in relation to others, meets the challenge of attending to both the inter-relational and the individually empowering aspects of action. The identity of the ‘I’ is a fleeting configuration of narratives that differs from moment to moment; but the capacity to say ‘I’ is constant. This definition of agency is able to account for the extent to which a subject may be constituted by power relations but is still invested in the subject’s unlimited emancipatory potential. In other words, a subject, even at the most basic level, may not be free to choose the content of certain identity-determining narratives, such as gender narratives; however, she always has the capacity to confront and change those narratives. This project draws on the work of Hannah Arendt to provide a feminist politics based on this account of narrative agency. Arendt’s political theory is chiefly concerned with appearance: agency, for Arendt, involves appearing to another member of a plurality through speech or action. This basic schematic is relevant to the analysis of several key aspects of a feminist theory of narrative agency: especially identity, mutual recognition, solidarity, and judgment. For Arendt, identity is not reducible to a series of markers such as race or gender but is, instead, indefinite—composed of a mutable set of interests, or narratives. A subject is constantly negotiating the articulation of these interests, and yet she appears to, and is recognised by, others as a unique being. Solidarity, by these lights, arises not through pre-determined similarities but, rather, interests actively held in common. Conversations about these shared interests allow individual agents to articulate and negotiate judgments and opinions. Bringing together these resources from Arendt and reading them alongside problems of contemporary feminism allows me to endorse mutual recognition, solidarity, and conversation as vital attributes of an emancipatory feminist politics.«br /» «br /»