Rawls, Dworkin and Inheritance in Liberal Democracy

Abstract

This thesis examines whether Rawls or Dworkin's theory of justice is better at justifying restrictions on wealth inheritance in a liberal democracy. It sets out to argue that Dworkin's theory is better suited to guide a liberal democracy on justifying restrictions on wealth inheritance than Rawls's theory. This argument begins by proposing that the extant literature reflects a conflict between three intuitive judgements about what matters for the justice of restricting wealth inheritance in a liberal democracy. As a result the successful theory will have fewer disadvantages and more advantages in its impartial justification for restricting wealth inheritance to the liberal, opportunity and luck intuition. This thesis examines Rawls and Dworkin's theories because both theorists propose views that aim to be impartial and justifiable in a liberal democratic society. They both aim to cater to the associated concerns of protecting individual liberty and guaranteeing social equality. I examine both theories on this aim in three metrics. First I consider their internal coherency. In doing so I examine the coherency of Rawls's principles when they aim to treat social class and wealth inheritance differently. I then explore the coherency of Dworkin's prescriptions with the expectations individuals have in a liberal democracy. The second metric I consider is the ability of either theory to cater to each of the three relevant intuitions. This involves examining the scope of Rawls and Dworkin's theories and their competency in satisfying the concerns of the luck intuition. Lastly I consider the impartiality of the theories as the third metric. As such, I consider how well Rawls and Dworkin give equal consideration to the associated concerns of the opportunity and luck intuition.