Identity, morality and communicativeness: the principles of conscience

Abstract

What is the conscience? In this thesis I argue that, contrary to received wisdom, the conscience is not simply the moral sense, or the capacity to make moral judgements. I argue that conscience cannot be analysed in terms of any individually necessary conditions. Conscience (or as it is sometimes called ‘conscientiousness’), is a cluster concept. It can be analysed in terms of three principles which do not necessitate some thought or act being conscientious but, rather, count in favour, of that thought or act being conscientious. The three principles of conscience are identity (‘conscientious identity’), morality and communicativeness. Over the course of the thesis I articulate an argument in favour of my account of conscience through reference to both historical accounts of conscience (such as the accounts of Bishop Butler, Kant and Heidegger) and to recent discussions in moral philosophy (including the work of Kimberley Brownlee, Michael Bratman and Marina Oshana). Ultimately, I argue, these three principles are the principles of conscience because they capture, in different ways, what is valuable about conscience; they capture what a right of conscience purports to protect.