The Structure and Function of the Idea of “God” in Idealist Logic

Abstract

This thesis is a study of the role of the idea of “God” in the systematic metaphysics of rationality found in Kant’s and Hegel’s work. It surveys some basic structural components of their views of theoretical and practical reason and argues for the centrality of certain theological commitments to their broader metaphysical positions. The connection between these theological commitments and a broader metaphysical program is instituted in theories of conceptual determination constitutive of both transcendental idealism and absolute idealism. The connection is found in Kant’s view of the limits of human knowledge and action; these are seen as problematic given the way such limits are supposedly at once both a priori restrictions and yet also incomprehensible. The obscurity of this view has made it a well-known target of attack from Hegelian quarters, and the thesis proceeds by defending certain components of this Kantian view, while making concessions to the Hegelian view that Kant’s retention of such a problematic perspective on unconditioned knowledge and moral perfection was a mistake. The first part of the work takes account of some general prejudices found in discourse about both philosophical theology and philosophical anthropology, and makes some remarks about the kind of metaphysical dogmatisms which should be discarded in these arenas. Part two involves an examination of certain metarepresentational structures in Kant’s philosophy and seeks to undermine some of them by appeals to Hegelian theses about rational, conceptual determination. This discussion is connected with Hegel’s reflections on religion. In the third part Kant’s principle of complete determination is examined; its connection with his theology and theory of judgment is discussed, and a Hegelian response to it is recommended. The overall conclusion is that Hegel’s theological views are connected with a more plausible thesis of the nature of normative constraint.